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Internal migration in China during the last three decades, the largest in human history, offers a rare 
opportunity to understand inequalities in the making. Using data spanning 10 years from China’s largest 
metropolis, Shanghai, this study assesses how enduring state institutions interplay with the spread of 
market forces to shape income inequality between migrants and native urban workers. Though the wages 
of both Chinese migrants and urban workers rose considerably, economic restructuring during the decade 
under study resulted in diminished privileges for urbanites and subsequently increased collision between 
migrants and urban workers in the private sectors. These shifts, rather than substantially reducing 
inequality, have led to an evolving form of inequality, from an initial general blatant discrimination 
against migrants across the board, to a new and more subtle form of inequality characterized by 
substantial segmented discrimination against migrants within economic sectors, with the degree of 
inequality varying from sector to sector. We discuss how this changing inequality reflects complementary 
rather than competing roles of the state and market institutions in inequality creation and maintenance. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past three decades, over 220 million Chinese left their home origins to move across the 
country—, mostly from rural areas to urban destinations—forming the largest migration flow in modern 
human history (Liang and Ma, 2004; NBS, 2011). Geographical mobility in China was largely restricted 
until the late 1970s, when the economic opportunities that emerged from China’s market reforms gave 
rise to this large migratory stream. At the same time, however, this stream has been conditioned by a pre-
existing bifurcated social structure that separates urban and rural Chinese into two categories of citizens 
(Chan and Zhang, 1999; Solinger, 1999; Wang et al., 2002). China’s recent migration process is therefore 
not just a story of economic change, but also fundamentally a process of inequality maintenance at a 
massive scale. It offers an unusual opportunity for understanding the interplay between the enduring state 
institutions and the spread of a market economy.  
 
  Migration has fueled China’s economic boom and in the meantime has also forced a re-drawing of 
China’s social landscape. Upon their arrival in cities, rural migrants were constantly met with blatant 
exclusion and differentiation. Nowadays, they are not the only group struggling at the bottom of urban 
society. As China’s economic reforms unfolded, privatization and restructuring of the state enterprises 
since the mid-1990s introduced new inequality-generating mechanisms to China (Meng, 2004). They also 
resulted in massive layoffs (Naughton, 2007), pushing many urban workers into private sectors and 
positions traditionally occupied by migrant workers, consequently changing the labor market structure in 
Chinese cities. 
 
 How do these changes in the most recent stage of market reforms shape patterns of inequality 
between migrants and native urban workers? The present study sets out to answer this question. We first 
illustrate the separate roles of the state and the market in the migration and labor market processes. We 
then discuss how the interests and goals of the state and market actors become increasingly intertwined 
and how such a combination of the state and the market affects the migrant-native inequality. 
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Furthermore, we offer an over-time comparative analysis of the patterns of inequality, using data 
collected in China’s largest metropolis, Shanghai, at two time points over the course of deepening market 
reforms (1995 and 2005). Our results show that the state and market forces have interacted to result in 




2.1. State, market, and inequality 
Inequality exists not only because individuals possess different traits, but also because collective action 
and institutions structure individuals into categories and structure inequalities along these categories 
(Tilly, 1999). The basic mechanisms in generating and perpetuating inequality include exploitation and 
opportunity hoarding. The state and the market are the two most consequential institutional forces in 
creating and shaping inequality. Labor market inequality, whether in access to opportunities or in ultimate 
economic outcomes, is often perceived in part as an intrinsic feature of competitive market mechanisms, 
or as a result of market restructuring or market failure (Bator, 1958; Gravelle and Rees, 2004). In addition 
to differential human capital endowments among individuals, inequalities exist because of the dual 
structure of the labor market, and other categorical boundaries such as race and ethnicity that create and 
maintain discrimination (Becker, 1971; Piore, 1979). The dual labor market perspective, in particular, 
takes a structural approach and posits the important role of structural demands in shaping access to labor 
market opportunities and thus economic inequality in advanced market economies, including the demand 
for international migration (Piore, 1979; Massey et al., 1998). Another inequality-generating mechanism 
lies in changing occupational and wage structures. One recent debate, for instance, discusses the extent to 
which rising general economic inequality in the United States is attributable to the growing intra-
occupational vis-à-vis inter-occupational disparities (Kim and Sakamoto, 2008; Mouw and Kalleberga, 
2010). Economic restructuring also has important implications for immigrants’ labor market conditions. 
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The declines of middle-level jobs in the U.S., for instance, are thought to have a detrimental effect on the 
income of unskilled minority and immigrant workers (Waters and Eschbach, 1995). 
 
  Another perspective of inequality formation emphasizes the role of the state in formulating roles 
within which the market functions (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Granovette, 1985). This view contends that 
the state and market are not self-evolving, but mutually constituting processes (Polanyi, 1944; Block and 
Evans, 2005). Inequality is determined by market competition as well as by institutional structures that 
undergird the market competition. Depending on how a market is structured and organized institutionally, 
it can produce more or less inequality. Previous studies have examined how state policies influence 
inequality by providing or redistributing structures of opportunity and by intervening to overcome market 
failure (Gustafsson and Johansson, 1999). This line of research has demonstrated the varying efficacy of 
state policies in reducing inequality in the workplace, especially under institutional deficiencies that 
engender rent seeking (Kalev et al., 2006). However, this literature has paid less attention to the interplay 
between the state and market in affecting inequality, which is what the present study seeks to address. 
 
 In the context of international migration, earlier research has highlighted confrontations between 
the logic of the market and the logic of the state in handling migration flows (Entzinger et al., 2004). The 
market has an inherent drive for expansion, and immigration plays into this need. The state, by contrast, 
pursues the ultimate goal of regulating migration. This contradiction has contributed to a growing tension 
between the needs of a competitive market economy and those of the state in immigration control. It has 
led to a “liberal paradox” in which the state is pushed toward greater openness in the face of globalizing 
economic forces, and is thus prevented from effectively regulating immigration (Freeman, 2004). In 
addition to immigration regulation, students of nation-state politics have portrayed a complex role that 
state institutions play in conditioning inequalities confronting immigrants (Rivera-Batiz, 1999; Lewin-
Epstein et al., 2003; Freeman, 2004). Among the state policies that bear on immigrant incorporation are 
the methods of enforcing immigration rules regarding unauthorized entry and work, and the rules 
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regulating acquisition of rights. Some argue that the nation-states politics of citizenship have 
unintentionally resulted in the vulnerable position of undocumented immigrants, as they have encouraged 
greater discrimination and exploitation against undocumented immigrants by passing the premium of 
unauthorized hiring to the workers (Donato and Massey, 1993). 
 
 The roles of the state and market in shaping inequality are especially pertinent in societies 
undergoing structural transformations. Early literature following the collapse of the communist camp 
focuses on the market as an agent of change, highlighting its potential role in altering the structure of 
opportunities and as an equalizer for pre-existing inequality created under state socialism (e.g. Nee, 
1989). Nevertheless, the majority of studies in the last two decades have demonstrated that the 
development of market mechanisms is inseparable from state institutions (Walder, 1994; Bian and Logan, 
1996; Parish and Michelson, 1996; Zhou, 2000). In many cases, political power was converted to 
economic advantage. Increasingly, students of transitional socialist societies converge to recognize that 
existing state institutions and the spread of market mechanisms mold and adapt to each other (Zhou, 
2000), and that the market has no inherent impact on inequality (Walder, 1996). Rather, the role of the 
state in fostering equality or maintaining inequality largely depends on the state’s goals and interests. 
Studies of the joint roles of the state and the market in creating inequality in China have thus far focused 
on the urban or rural sector, not on those who cross the boundaries between urban and rural areas, namely 
the large volume of domestic migrants. This study seeks to bridge this gap by bringing migration into the 
picture. In what follows we delineate how migration in China has been driven and sustained by both 
market incentives and state interests, and how these two structural forces have consistently intertwined to 
shape the inequality confronting migrants. 
 
2.2. Migration and inequality in China 
2.2.1. Dual citizenship and the changing urban labor market 
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China’s economic boom has benefited largely from the availability of a massive pool of cheap rural labor 
under a regime of differential citizenship. This differential citizenship, based on the household 
registration (hukou) system, constitutes no doubt the most glaring and long-lasting legacy of inequality in 
modern China (Whyte, 2010). Rural-to-urban migration was prohibited until the late 1970s, in part as a 
result of the urban-biased developmental policies. Thus, rural residents have much lower standards of 
living and fewer privileges than urban residents, and rural areas experience a surplus of labor (Chan and 
Zhang, 1999). Since the beginning of the economic reforms, economic opportunities, combined with 
surplus labor in the countryside, created an unprecedented flow of rural-to-urban migrants, estimated at 
over 220 million according to the most recent Chinese census in 2010 (NBS, 2011). In many cities, as 
much as 30-40% of the population is constituted of migrants from rural areas.  
 Early rural migrants were drawn by a wide array of job opportunities in cities, such as construction, 
selling agricultural goods and processing garments. Over time, economic opportunities for migrants 
expanded to include marketing, services, and manufacturing in non-state owned factories (Solinger, 
1999). However, until the 1990s, private businesses faced considerable official discrimination and offered 
low economic returns compared to jobs in state enterprises (Fan, 2002). At the same time, migrants were 
largely excluded from the state sector, and were commonly cut off from many socialist privileges 
associated with an urban registration, including quality schools, health care, and housing (Solinger, 1999). 
Though the state has sought to improve the services provided for migrants over time, the hukou system 
has remained extremely difficult to change and has not changed in any fundamental way (Chan and 
Buckingham, 2008). Earlier studies of the Chinese migration process have highlighted the precarious 
labor market conditions of migrants relative to urbanites in China, with rural migrants excluded from 
many opportunities and benefits and receiving low wages (Solinger, 1999; Meng and Zhang, 2001; Wang 
et al., 2002). In many respects, the life circumstances of rural migrants bear a great resemblance to those 
of illegal immigrants in industrialized societies (Roberts, 1997). 
 In contrast to the persistent hukou system, the urban labor market has seen a profound 
transformation during the last one and a half decade. Since the mid-1990s, many state-owned enterprises 
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have been shut down, restructured, or privatized (Appleton et al., 2002; Naughton, 2007). By the mid-
2000s, the share of employees in state-owned enterprises had been more than halved (Cai et al., 2008). 
Much of the 50 million laid-off urban workers ended up in the private sector (Solinger, 2002). 
Meanwhile, the government lifted official discrimination toward private businesses and began to give 
them greater protection. In 2002, the Chinese Constitution was amended to put private businesses on an 
equal footing with state corporations (at least in theory). The private sector has grown rapidly, and income 
in non-state firms has increased steadily. Entrepreneurial opportunities have also been increasingly 
rewarded. The self-employed, from small business owners to entrepreneurs running firms of all sizes, 
have expanded their wealth. Such activities have been undertaken not only by urbanites, but also, more 
often, by migrants, thus producing an increasing number of newly rich and allowing some migrants to 
achieve a relatively desirable livelihood (Davis, 1999). Migrant wage earners in non-state sector may 
switch to self-employment to improve their income, provided that they have necessary financial and 
social resources. 
 
 Despite the general economic improvement experienced by the average Chinese, millions of layoffs 
and an increasing number of newly rich have increased the overall level of income inequality (Knight and 
Song 2005). As urban workers began to take on non-state sector jobs—including low-paying jobs with 
few benefits—a new labor market structure emerged in which urbanites and migrants increasingly 
competed in the private sector, especially in professions such as service, retailing, and petty trade. Despite 
these changes in the past one and a half decade, very limited research has examined recent patterns of 
labor market inequality facing migrants and most existing studies are based on data collected before the 
early 2000s. 
 
2.2.2. State, market, and migration 
To shed light on the question of inequality, we next illustrate the roles of the state and market in 
migration and labor market transformation. We contend that the state and market forces have intertwined 
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in directing and conditioning migration in China. Contrary to the tensions in many industrialized societies 
between the state and market toward immigration issues, in China these two structural forces have 
established congruent goals and adopted complementary rather than competing roles in maintaining 
inequality against migrants. 
 
 Previous research shows that the origin of Chinese migration was market-based as well as state-
directed (Guang, 2005). Since the early 1980s, state-instituted economic reforms have created a 
considerable need for consumer goods and services in urban areas. The mobility control instituted by the 
state was relaxed to facilitate rural-to-urban labor flows to meet the growing urban needs and enable 
labor-intensive industrialization (Chan and Zhang, 1999). Along with the voluminous migration flow, 
however, the hukou system has remained, channeling and constraining migrants to the non-state sector. 
Over time, the intensified shift from redistribution to market mechanisms, while increasing the legitimacy 
of economic activities in the non-state sector, has led to the downsizing of state enterprises and 
unemployment for local urban residents. Some local residents began moving into the non-state sector, 
voluntarily and involuntarily, hence intensifying the competition between locals and migrants. Following 
outbreaks of social unrest due to surging urban employment, a series of state policies have been enacted 
to protect the urban laid-offs workers, assisting their transition and reemployment. Social and labor 
protection for migrants, however, is close to nonexistent (Chan and Buckingham, 2008), and the 
government continues to ban independent unions for migrant workers. 
 
 Concomitant with the deepening market reforms, market competition has intensified, as well as the 
need to reduce labor cost for profit maximization. Thus, market-oriented employers increasingly exploit 
the institutional bifurcation to obtain competitive advantages by discriminating against rural migrants (for 
example, providing limited access to certain labor market opportunities, as well as unequal treatment in 
the labor market). The Chinese state, while distinguishing itself from other states in that it has retained 
considerable control of the market economy, has failed to effectively legislate against discriminatory 
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practices toward migrants. Such discrimination, in essence, is legitimized by the state-instituted hukou 
system. It is also largely tolerated by the state, as it serves the state’s increasing emphasis on economic 
growth and its rising profit-seeking incentive, and plays into the entrenched state protectionism that 
defends the employment of urban citizens, who increasingly lose their share of privileges (who are also 
the regime’s important supporters). The state and market forces have therefore intersected to create and 
maintain a pool of expendable and exploitable labor in China’s booming economy. Such institutionalized 
discrimination is also likely to lead to other (social) forms of discrimination, further constraining 
migrants’ gains from the booming economy and enduring the migrant-urbanite bifurcation. 
 
2.2.3. How has migrant-native inequality changed? 
What are the implications of these processes for the inequality between migrants and urban native 
residents over time? Based on the market transition perspective, the development of a market-based 
economy would result in the diminishing importance of ascribed status in the labor market. If so, one 
would expect hukou-based differentiation to erode in tandem with the diminishing socialist privileges 
enjoyed by urbanites. However, market reforms by themselves do not necessarily promote inclusion for 
“outsiders.” As discussed above, inequality-generating mechanisms in China are embedded within state 
institutions. The roles of the state and market in fostering equality or maintaining inequality largely 
depend on state and market actors’ interests and goals. Rather than promoting equal citizenship, the new 
market forces may be antagonistic or even detrimental to migrants’ interests while prior socialist 
institutions linger on. Such market discrimination is tacitly condoned by state regulators, as it is congruent 
with the state’s developmental and local protectionist goals. Overall, given these mechanisms, what is 
likely to happen is that the migrant-native inequality is effectively maintained by adapting into a new 
form, from general blatant discrimination by separating migrants and local residents into different 
economic sectors with vastly different economic returns (inter-sector inequality that discriminates against 
private-sector economic activities), to increasingly intra-sector inequality characterized by a more subtle 
but equally powerful form of discrimination against migrants within economic sectors, based simply on 
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individual migrant’s identity. Such a shift has resulted in a pattern of inequality that is more difficult to 
detect but more durable, which we refer to as segmented inequality. This is the first research question we 
examine. 
 
 Furthermore, because different economic sectors are under different pressures from market 
competition and different political rules, the level of inequality between migrants and urbanites may vary 
systematically across economic sectors. Examining the inequality against migrants in non-state sectors is 
particularly useful as it is closely shaped by the interplay between the two prominent forces, enduring 
state institutions and deepening market mechanisms. The level of inequality may be especially marked in 
the private sector as it has witnessed intensifying collision between migrants and local workers, and an 




The geographic location of the study is Shanghai. Located on the central eastern coast, Shanghai is the 
largest city in China, with 23 million people according to the latest census in 2010. It is also among the 
top migration destinations in China. In the last two decades, Shanghai has emerged as China’s preeminent 
economic center. It is, in large part, due to migrant workers that Shanghai has become China’s most 
dynamic and glamorous global metropolis. Annual flows of migrants have increased multi-fold, from 
merely 0.26 million in 1981 to over 7 million in 2010. Migrants currently account for nearly 40% of 
Shanghai’s resident population. 
 
 Shanghai is also a setting where comparable data on migration are available over time. We use data 
from two cross-sectional surveys conducted in Shanghai spanning 10 years. The first one, conducted in 
1995, has a migrant sample of 6609, and a sample of 3000 permanent Shanghai residents.1 The second 
survey was conducted in 2005, with a sample of over 2800 migrants and 1800 local residents.2 The 1995 
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and 2005 datasets are highly comparable from the survey design to the information collected. We sampled 
individuals aged 16-60 during the time of the interview, which is the typical working age in China. In 
both surveys, the inclusion criterion for local residents was based on local hukou registration. For 
migrants, the targeted sample was adults (age 16-60) who have stayed in Shanghai for over a month for 
work-related purposes (other than travel, short-term work assignment, hospital visits, family visits, and 
educational-related stays). If factories or other collective dwelling units (i.e., dormitories, where many 
migrants reside) were within the neighborhood, they were also included in the sampling frame. Moreover, 
both datasets gathered detailed information on demographics, socioeconomic background, as well as labor 
market process and outcomes such as occupational attainment and earnings. The timing of the surveys is 
essential, as mid to late 1990s marked the beginning of accelerating urban market reforms and massive 
layoffs in state enterprises. The data thus allow for an investigation of inequality during both the earlier 
and later stages of the economic reform. 
 It should be acknowledged that this study is limited geographically to Shanghai, and its 
implications for a general understanding of the Chinese urban labor market should not be overstated. 
Further studies are needed to establish the generality of the results. Nevertheless, Shanghai is one of the 
largest migration destinations and a destination with considerable market opportunities and relatively 
open policies toward migrants. The fact that there remains a large intra-sector gap between migrants and 
locals (as discussed below) suggests that these findings are likely to apply to many, though not all, parts 
of China. 
  The labor market outcomes we study are monthly income and hourly wage. Monthly income was 
collected directly from survey respondents, measured by average monthly cash income including wages, 
bonuses, and subsidies.3 For the self-employed, information on net income, rather than gross income, was 
collected. Hourly wage was constructed using information on monthly income and average monthly work 
hours. Comparing results using these two income variables provides additional insights on the degree of 
exploitation encountered by migrants (e.g., long working hours). Our focus is on monthly income, as it is 
a more accurate measure in China because many workers, especially migrants, are not paid at hourly rates 
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but by piecework (Solinger, 1999). For both income measures, we excluded a handful of outliers and 
applied deflators for Shanghai to adjust the 1995 income level to reflect the 2005 nominal values, based 
on the Consumer Price Index published by the Shanghai Bureau of Statistics of China.  
 
  We distinguished three economic sectors by ownership type (state-owned, non-state-owned, and 
individual-owned). While most existing studies differentiate state and non-state sectors, we made further 
distinctions between wage earners and individual owners (getihu and siying qiye zhu) in the private sector, 
as they have different employment relationships and earning structures. Thus, this variable not only 
distinguishes state vs. non-state sectors, but also differentiates between different employment types. The 
data do not permit us to distinguish different types of individual ownership, or domestic and foreign 
private firms. We grouped a small number of collective enterprises with private enterprises because they 
increasingly resemble private rather than public work organizations. Since very few respondents were in 
collective enterprises, excluding collective employees from the analysis did not change the results. 
Information on the ownership type was not gathered in 1995 because there was very little overlap before 
the mid-1990s between urban residents (vast majority in the public sector) and migrants (almost all in the 
private sector). In the analysis, we also adjusted for the occupational status as measured by occupations 
and industries, which are important determinants of income. We differentiated four occupational 
categories (professional/managerial/clerical, commerce, service, and manual labor), and eight industrial 
categories (manufacturing and production, service, finance/communication /real estate, social services, 
science/health/education/entertainment, government, and other).  
 
 The key predictor is migration status. We distinguished urban residents (with local Shanghai hukou) 
and rural-origin migrants (with non-local rural hukou). We did not include a small group of urban-origin 
migrants (with non-local urban hukou) in the analysis, but carried out additional analysis assessing the 
relative labor market conditions of this group. To study disparities in labor market outcomes, we adjusted 
for the differences between rural migrants and urbanites in demographic characteristics such as age, 
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gender, and marital status, as well as productivity-related characteristics including levels of education and 
seniority at the current job. The inclusion of these variables was based on the widely used human capital 
model (Mincer, 1974). Ideally we would have liked to control for work experience, but such information 
was unavailable. Thus, we used seniority at the current job as a proxy, in keeping with what many 
previous studies have done. All measures described above were constructed the same way in 1995 and 
2005. 
 
 To examine income inequality while adjusting standard errors for clustering at the neighborhood 
level, we used survey linear regressions with log transformed monthly income and hourly wage as the 
dependent variables, controlling for demographic, socioeconomic, and occupational status. The regression 
coefficients can be read as the percentage change in income with one unit change in the covariates. All 
analyses were weighted to be representative of the local and migrant population in 1995 and 2005 in 
Shanghai using information from the National Population Surveys. We estimated a sequence of models, 
first adjusting for demographic and socioeconomic status and then adding occupational status (occupation 
and industry in both years; and an additional model further controlling for the ownership sector in 2005). 
If equally productive individuals within the same occupational categories are rewarded differently simply 
because of their hukou status, we speculate that this is largely reflective of discrimination against 
migrants. However, it should be acknowledged that we cannot definitively determine the mechanisms 
generating the remaining income gap (inequality) because of potential unobserved factors. Furthermore, 
to assess differential levels of inequality across economic sectors, we performed separate analyses for 
respondents in different sectors. In all cross-temporal and cross-sectoral analysis, we examined whether 
the differences were statistically meaningful using appropriate tests, but presented stratified results to 
simplify interpretations.  
 
4. Results 
4.1. Changing labor markets and labor profiles 
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Over a 10-year period, many changes have taken place in the demographic and socioeconomic profiles of 
both local residents and migrants. As shown in Table 1, what was persistent was that migrants were 
younger and less educated than urban residents, and they were largely concentrated in non-professional 
occupations, service and manufacturing industries, and non-state sectors. Over time, migrants were 
increasingly composed of older individuals, women, and those with slightly higher levels of education. 
There also seemed to be a shift from individual to family migration, as the share of married migrants 
increased considerably. 
 
 Particularly interesting was that, while job tenure decreased for urban residents from 15 years to 11 
years, for rural migrants it increased from 1.7 to 3.6 years. Also, in contrast to urban residents, who 
benefited from continuing educational expansion and whose educational attainment improved notably in 
the 10-year period, there was much less change in the education among migrants. The Index of 
Dissimilarity even revealed an increasing disparity in educational attainment between the locals and 
migrants, from 30% in 1995 to 40% in 2005. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 With respect to income, there was significant improvement for both groups as a result of expanding 
economic opportunities. The rate of increase in monthly income for migrants (2.6 times) even seemed to 
slightly exceed that for locals (2.2 times). This did not hold for hourly wage, however, suggesting that 
migrants tended to work increasingly long hours. Income gap between migrants and local residents, once 
substantial and in favor of urban residents, seemed to have narrowed over the decade. In 1995, local 
residents had an average monthly income about 40% higher than migrants. By 2005, the gap shrank by 
over half to 18%. However, in addition to the educational and occupational gap to be discussed below, 
there remained a substantial gap in working conditions and social benefits. Migrants worked many more 
hours than local residents, and this gap increased between 1995 and 2005. While the fraction of local 
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residents with formal contract and social insurance increased over time (formal contract: 56% in 1995 to 
77% in 2005; social insurance: 87% in 1995 to 96% in 2005), the share of migrants stagnated at low 
levels (formal contract: 47% in 1995 and 39% in 2005; social insurance: 13% in 1995 to 19% in 2005) 
(results not shown in the table).  
 
 Urban residents and migrants moved occupationally in rather different directions over time. Though 
locals were still much more likely to occupy the state sector than migrants in 2005, many also entered 
private sectors (57%) or took service jobs (19%). A large fraction of them may have been former 
employees in state enterprises that were pushed to the private sector through layoffs. For migrants, while 
a large fraction were still employed as wage earners in private sectors and confined to manual or service 
jobs, a small group penetrated the state sector, where profit and income were likely to be dependably 
regular. Others (close to 30%) opened their own businesses, gradually becoming better off in material 
terms. Overall, we find that a group of migrants were able to achieve higher income and more prestigious 
occupations than before. In particular, self-employment has clearly become a means for migrants to 
achieve high earning potentials and reduce the income gap with urbanites. At the other end, many 
migrants still faced fewer choices and were stuck with low-wage jobs and limited occupational mobility.  
 
 There was also a substantial increase in income across all occupational categories. Wages in the 
private sector (for wage earners only) by 2005 reached almost 90% of the state sector wages (Table 2). 
Although we did not have direct information on income by sector in 1995, we could proxy it using the 
average income for residents and migrants in 1995 (Table 1) because these two groups concentrated in 
different sectors. Roughly, those in private sectors and the self-employed (migrants) earned only 70% of 
what those in state sectors (local residents) earned. By 2005, the self-employed had the highest net 
income compared to wage earners in both the private and state sectors. Similar patterns were observed 
across occupational categories. In 1995 those in professional and clerical positions out-earned the rest of 
the workforce. By 2005 residents and migrants holding commerce jobs enjoyed the highest income. These 
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findings demonstrate that non-state firms and especially the self-employed have obtained an increasingly 
competitive income level relative to that of state enterprises since the mid-1990s.  
 [Table 2 about here] 
 
 These improvements, nevertheless, were not evenly distributed. There has been increasing income 
polarization among migrants and among residents. We calculated the Gini coefficient, an indicator of 
inequality, for the overall sample and separately for urbanites and migrants. We see that the level of 
inequality has grown remarkably over time for all workers in Shanghai (0.29 in 1995 and 0.38 in 2005), 
for local residents (0.28-0.35), and particularly for migrants (0.26-0.39). In Table 2, we also noticed that 
across occupations and economic sectors, local residents continued to earn significantly more than 
migrants in each category. The results in Table 2, nevertheless, should be interpreted with caution because 
residents and migrants had very different demographic and socioeconomic profiles, which may explain 
the raw difference (e.g., migrants were more likely to be female and less educated). We next provide 
more rigorous analysis via multivariate regressions. 
 
4.2. From general (inter-sector) to segmented (intra-sector) inequality 
In Table 3, we present regression results of monthly income for 1995 and 2005. We first controlled for 
demographics and human capital (Model 1). We then added occupational status to examine the relative 
importance of inter- and intra-occupational and sectoral inequality (Models 2 and 3).  In 1995, there was a 
large income gap across all models. Human capital and the sorting of migrants and residents into different 
occupations and industries helped account for a considerable fraction of the income gap. Nevertheless, 
migrants’ economic disadvantage remained large after adjusting for all of these differences, at 12% (from 
40%, Table 1). Because there was little competition between migrants and residents in the state and the 
private sector, this gap could be largely attributed to the structural wage disparities that discriminated 
economic activities in the non-state sector. 
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[Table 3 about here] 
 
 In a decade time, by 2005, the raw income gap between rural migrants and local residents was 
reduced by over half to 18% (Table 1). After taking account for the differences in demographics and 
human capital, however, migrants did not seem to differ significantly from local residents and even 
seemed to receive a small income premium (Model 1). This stood in stark contrast from 1995 when 
migrants received an income penalty of more than 10% after similar controls. Overall economic growth, 
especially the boom of the private sector and the economic opportunities conferred by self-employment, 
was undoubtedly an important engine for this change. Another reason was the income polarization for 
both residents and migrants, which led to more overlap of the income distribution between the two 
groups. Altogether, they gave an impression that the substantial disparities against rural migrants have 
diminished greatly and even seemed to disappear. 
 
One other possible explanation is the increasing educational discrepancy between the two groups. 
As shown in Table 1, migrants’ education has substantially lagged behind that of locals. Inequalities in 
human capital thus grew between migrants and locals, accounting for a large fraction of income 
differences (note that, in Table 3, education was highly predictive of income). This finding in part points 
to the differential distribution of educational resources between rural and urban China as they are 
systematically channeled to urban residents at the expense of their rural counterparts. To the extent that 
education opportunities are unevenly allocated while remaining key determinants of income in urban 
labor market, rural origin is unlikely to disappear as a salient base for labor market stratification. 
 
 The story, however, does not end here. Whereas the overall income gap seemed to disappear after 
adjusting for human capital attributes, the gap reemerged once we introduced occupational characteristics 
(Model 2), and especially when we included economic sector in the models (Model 3). In Model 3, we 
again observed a significant income gap of over 9% against rural migrants. This suggests that when 
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comparing migrants and residents within economic sectors, migrants on average earned much less than 
urban residents even after controlling for human capital and occupational characteristics. In 1995, the 
large gap was mostly attributable to the high level of labor market segregation and official discrimination 
toward private sectors. In 2005 the remaining inequality likely reflected marked discrimination against 
migrants within economic sectors. These findings revealed an important labor market reconfiguration 
during the past one and a half decade in China which broke down the traditional state and private barriers 
dividing the urban labor market, leading to an increasing competition between locals and migrants in the 
non-state sector. The seeming integration in the private sector did not result in genuine economic 
integration, though. The competition did not occur on a level-playing field, leading to a new form of 
inequality:  from general blatant discrimination (inter-sector) to segmented inequality (intra-sector), as 
formulated in our first research question. 
 
 We carried out an additional analysis for a small sample of urban-origin migrants and found no 
significant gap between them and urban residents. This may be in part because urban-urban migrants were 
a relatively selective group and often experienced job relocation. Descriptive statistics showed that urban 
migrants had similar levels of education compared to urban residents. These results suggested that the 
most overt discrimination was reflected in hukou-based inequality against people of rural origins (results 
not shown but available on request). 
 
 In Table 3, other important predictors of income included age, gender, education, job tenure, and 
occupational status, which were consistent with what we would expect. There was a curvilinear 
relationship between age and income. Men on average earned more than women. Education was 
positively associated with income: those with post-secondary education earned over 40% more than those 
with less than middle school education in 1995 and the difference was over 50% in 2005. Five years of 
additional work experience led to 5% increase in monthly income. Service and manual workers earned 
significantly less than professional workers. However, the coefficient for commerce changed signs 
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between Model 2 and 3. This should be interpreted with caution because there might be some 
multicollinearity between this category and economic sectors. However, a multicollinearity test does not 
turn out to be significant and an additional analysis omitting the occupation variable yields highly 
consistent results with Model 3. With respect to income differences across economic sectors, wage 
earners in state and private sectors fared similarly, but both earned less compared to the self-employed.  
  
To explore the roles of market-based forces (human capital and occupations) and institutional 
forces (migration status and economic sectors), we first examine changes in R-squares presented in Table 
3. Results show that the inclusion of occupational and sectoral variables helps explain a significant 
proportion of the variability in income. We also estimated a new model (not shown in Table 3) controlling 
for only human capital and occupational variables, and compared it with the full model (further adjusting 
for migration status and economic sectors; Model 3). The R-squares increase from 0.36 to 0.40. An F test 
shows that this increase is statistically significant (p < 0.001). In addition, we calculated standardized 
coefficients for Model 3 (Table 3) to facilitate comparing the relative importance of coefficients in a 
model. Results (not shown) suggest that in 2005 economic sectors have the largest explanatory power, 
followed by education, occupation, and migration status. All of these results highlight the important role 




4.3. Segmentation and segmented inequality 
We further examine the mechanisms of inequality across economic sectors. In 2005, as in 1995, only a 
small proportion of migrants were in professional or clerical positions, and almost none were in the 
government or in state monopolized industries such as finance, communication, and real estate (Table 1). 
By 2005, only 7% of migrant laborers, comparing to almost 43% of local Shanghai residents, were 
employed in the state-owned sector. This reflected the stickiness of the hukou system that continued to 
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deny migrants’ access to the state sector, especially given growing urban unemployment since the late 
1990s. The substantial exclusion of migrants from professional jobs and the state sector was also 
supported by multinomial logistic regressions (Table 4). We see that in 2005, more so than in 1995, 
migrants were even more likely to end up in blue-collar occupational categories (commerce, service, and 
manual jobs) compared with local residents. The contrast between migrants and local residents held for 
ownership type: migrants were much more likely to end up in non-state sectors vs. the state sector, and 
especially as self-employed. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
 These results suggest that the increasing competition between migrants and residents was largely a 
result of locals entering the non-state sector rather than of migrants penetrating the state sector. At the 
same time as the central state pressed for more market-oriented reforms, municipal governments 
strengthened barriers for state enterprises and high-paying occupations from employing rural migrants. A 
large number of migrants thus resorted to self-employment. The number of self-employed migrants far 
exceeded that of urbanites (by seven-fold). Over a decade time, while more locals entered the private 
sector, voluntarily or involuntarily, labor market segmentation toward migrants had solidified. 
 
 Such labor market segmentation has important implications for income inequality across economic 
sectors. Results of monthly income by ownership sector are shown on the top panel in Table 5. Of the 
three ownership sectors, migrants recruited by state agencies, despite a very small group, fared similarly 
compared to local residents. The coefficient of migration status was small and the standard error was 
large. The state-owned sector emerged as the least discriminatory against migrants, yielding rather 
egalitarian labor market outcomes. While this may partly reflect the lingering egalitarian doctrines in the 
state sector, it is also important to keep in mind that only a small number of migrants could enter the state 
sector, usually those favorably selected with respect to education, skills, or other resources rare among the 
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majority of migrants (Knight and Song, 2005). This positive selection may also explain the rather similar 
outcomes. As we will see later, rural migrants, even when employed in state enterprises, were often 
treated as temporary or out-of-plan workers with few benefits, and faced substantial exploitation. 
 
 [Table 5 about here] 
 
 It is in the non-state sector that migrants encountered more inequality. Migrants employed in the 
private sector suffered an income penalty of 7% in monthly income. This gap persisted even when 
occupation and industry characteristics were controlled for. This finding of substantial inequality against 
migrants outside the state sector demonstrates the interplay between the state and market forces. Non-
state enterprises developed unequal reward structures based on the hukou distinction. This was partly 
driven by the market incentive to reduce labor cost for market competitiveness. Urban private employers, 
facing intensified competition, increasingly learned to take advantage of migrants’ marginal status. Such 
discriminatory labor practices were compounded with the goals of the state (especially local state 
authorities) to shield the interests of urbanites. Following the massive layoffs of urban workers, urban 
residents increasingly complained that their job prospects suffered because of the large number of migrant 
workers (Solinger, 2002). In the private sector, minimum wages, mostly applied to migrants, were usually 
set locally and had steadily fallen below the national guidelines. Also, the minimum wage regulations 
were far from strictly enforced and scrutinized because local governments were also hijacked by special 
interests to profit from the gains of private firms. Instead, local authorities imposed regulations restricting 
the hiring of migrants in certain professions, and in certain cases encouraged firing of migrants to provide 
jobs for city residents or artificially lowering the wages of migrants to offer compensations for local 
workers (Wang et al., 2002).  
 
 The earnings gap turns out to be the largest for the self-employed, with migrants receiving a 22% 
disadvantage in monthly income (far exceeding the overall gap in 1995, 12%). Despite the significant 
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income premium of entrepreneurship (vs. wage earners) and despite self-employment becoming a popular 
economic option among rural migrants, the gains did not go to the majority of those in this sector, namely 
migrants. Even for the self-employed, who established their own rules and whose earnings were supposed 
to be less tied to the institutional arrangements, migrants and locals were in different hierarchies. 
Entrepreneurship thus played a limited role in assisting migrants to break through institutional barriers in 
the mainstream economy.  
 
 Because private businesses included very different types of units, from tiny street shops to small-
scale factories, we adjusted for the industry of business in the regression (results available upon request). 
This explained a large proportion of the local-migrant gap, suggesting that migrants faced considerable 
structural constrains in entering more profitable industries or patronizing large businesses compared to 
locals. Migrants’ businesses commonly congregated in small-scale business niches and mainly catered to 
low-income populations. In addition, coming from a rural background, migrant business owners 
encountered considerable capital constraints to start their business. They also had little power in the 
broader political economy, receiving limited institutional support and possessing limited social capital 
that could provide crucial information, financial resources, and practical assistance. For example, there 
has been a series of preferential investment and taxation policies concerning local workers, especially 
laid-off workers, to help them establish and run private businesses (i.e., tax and fee exemption). In 
contrast, higher fees and taxes were often imposed on migrants (Solinger, 1999). Access to urban 
bureaucrats was also important for one’s business success. Among locals, networks operated to 
consolidate their privileged position. Nevertheless, the possibility for the majority of migrants to establish 
positive relationships with state officials was prohibitively slim. They instead interacted intensively with 
other migrants, which connected them to a rather restricted set of people who themselves lacked access to 
the full range of resources available from the booming economy.4 
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 Overall, the results highlight segmented inequality mechanisms and different levels of inequality 
across economic sectors in the urban labor market, as formulated in our second research question. The 
state sector has imposed extremely limited access rules that deter the entry of the vast majority of 
migrants. By contrast, the market sector, where migrants and locals have increasingly collided, has 
adopted hukou-based institutional discrimination by developing unequal reward structures and 
constraining the gains of migrant business owners. This can be understood as a result of a combination of 
market imperatives and state protectionist policies. 
 
4.4. Substantial exploitation 
Migrants’ seeming overall improvement in monthly income has come at a high price, in the long work 
hours they put in and the few benefits they receive. Using hourly income as the dependent variable and 
contrasting the results with monthly income, we find a growing exploitation of migrants (see the hourly 
wage results from Tables 1 and 3). In contrast to the decreasing gap in monthly income over time, the 
disparities in hourly wage were much larger and endured over the decade after 1995. In 1995, hourly 
wage for employees with an urban hukou was 80% higher than rural migrants. By 2005, it stood at 71% 
(Table 1). Whereas local residents worked slightly over 40 h per week in both 1995 and 2005, rural 
migrants put in 54 h in 1995 and 61 h in 2005 (Table 1). Controlling for differences in demographic and 
human capital characteristics left an income penalty of 22% for rural migrants in 2005, roughly the same 
as in 1995 (bottom panel, Table 3). After controlling for occupational as well as ownership sector 
differences, the difference remained at 24% in 2005. 
 
 When disaggregating by ownership sector (bottom panel, Table 5), we find persistent inequalities in 
hourly wage across different sectors, even in the state sector (19%) where migrants seemed to fare 
similarly in monthly income to local workers. In private sectors, the gap of hourly wage was remarkably 
greater than that of monthly earnings (22% vs. 7% for private employees, and 35% vs. 22% for the self-
employed). Along with the decreasing gap in monthly income, the enduring disparity in hourly wage 
 25 
evidenced an increasing level of exploitation of migrants, partly a consequence of the lack of enforcement 
of regulations regarding working time and conditions. Among the self-employed, the gap manifested the 
self-exploitation that migrants undertook to compensate for the structural and social barriers they faced. 
 
 In addition to the income differentials, urban residents were also more likely to enjoy non-wage 
benefits such as various forms of social insurance (health insurance and pension) and a stable work 
environment (formal labor contrast). By 2005, migrants were still largely excluded from various social 
welfare provisions. The two dimensions of benefits favored urban residents over the 10 years, although an 
increasing number of migrants began to obtain a portion of these privileges. By 2005, less than 39% of 
migrants had formal contracts and less than 20% of them were covered by medical insurance or pension, 
in contrast to over 77% and 96% for urban residents, respectively. This substantial gap remained even 
when we used logistic regressions that adjusted for SES and occupational differences. Migrants remained 
far less likely to be protected by formal contracts (OR=0.30, p-value<0.001) and were excluded from 
many fringe benefits (OR=0.18, p-value<0.001). This gap held strong across all ownership sectors, even 
in the state sector (results of contract and insurance are not shown in tables). 
 
 Overall, these disparities reflect a wide coverage gap in China’s social protection system. Most 
rural migrants have continued to be left out of the urban welfare system and denied legally stipulated 
labor contracts and benefits. They have to endure not only discriminatory practices but also substantial 
exploitation because of their marginal status in the cities. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Migration in China during the last few decades offers a valuable opportunity to understand social and 
economic inequality in the making. Comparing the experiences of two distinct social groups, migrants 
and local urban residents over a decade, this study assesses changes in perhaps the largest form of 
inequality in urban China, inequality based on the state-sponsored household registration system. The 
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results tell a broader story of the roles of enduring state institutions and deepening market mechanisms in 
maintaining and recreating inequality. 
 
Migration is as much a market-based as a state-directed process. It has allowed rural Chinese to work in 
cities, which was off-limits during China’s planned economy era. However, with this move, various 
forms of inequality have been created. A major conclusion based on our cross-temporal comparisons is 
that, despite the economic restructuring that has resulted in diminished privileges for urbanites and 
increased competition between migrants and urban workers, a new form of inequality has emerged that 
effectively reinforces the longstanding benefits of urbanites. In contrast to an initial general 
discrimination against migrants across the board (i.e., inter-sector discrimination against private-sector 
economic activities), migrants are now subject to a new form of inequality characterized by substantial 
segmented discrimination within economic sectors (intra-sector). The level of inequality is particularly 
salient in the private sector, which has witnessed an increasing collision between migrants and locals. 
Even self-employed migrants, who seem to be distant from state power, have had limited means of 
breaking through institutional barriers to attain economic equality. At the same time, migrants have 
continued to be blocked from economic activities in the state sector and to be subject to marked (even 
increasing) exploitation or self-exploitation across all economic sectors. 
 
The findings underscore the mechanisms through which the state and market forces increasingly 
intertwine in shaping inequality. Before the deepening market reforms, the experiences of migrants were 
largely embedded in state regulations and state discrimination against private sectors. Since the mid-
1990s, the interests and goals of the state and market have evolved to complement rather than compete 
with each other. On the one hand, intensified profit-seeking incentives have led market-oriented actors to 
capitalize on state-created rural-urban bifurcation in order to commodify rural migrants as cheap and 
exploitable labor. On the other hand, such discriminatory acts are not only enabled by state institutions 
but also tacitly condoned by state regulators because they serve the state’s developmentalist and local 
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governments’ protectionist goals. It should be noted that the Chinese state apparatus, rather than a unified 
actor, is decentralized and consists of a multitude of actors. Whereas the central government in recent 
years has progressively moved toward protecting migrants’ benefits, these attempts have had varying 
success at the local level, which is filled with entrenched urban interests. Municipal governments are 
hesitant to fully embrace migrants given a lack of both incentives and resources, especially as economic 
restructuring since the mid 1990s has left local authorities struggling with serious unemployment. This 
has led to a series of protectionist policies for urban residents but close to nonexistent social protection for 
migrants. In recent years, in large part due to rapid fertility decline and expansion in higher education, 
some Chinese cities and industries have begun to experience a relative shortage of low-skilled migrant 
labor. While such a shortage has led to a relatively rapid increase in the wage of these migrants, no clear 
signs are present to suggest that the structural forces separating migrants and urbanites have changed in 
any significant way.  
 
The present study adds to the literature on the role of the state and market forces in patterns of inequality 
among urbanites (Zhou 2000; Wang 2008) by incorporating migrants into the picture. Among urban 
residents, inequality has largely existed across categorical boundaries (i.e., across economic enterprises 
and sectors) (Wang 2008). Between migrants and locals, by contrast, we show that inequality increasingly 
resides within sectors as a result of segmented discrimination in the private sector. Such a contrast points 
to the varying nature of the state-market relationship, and suggests how the role of the state in either 
fostering equality or maintaining inequality is conditioned by its interests and goals. In the first scenario 
(within urbanities), market forces compete with the redistributive system to gain economic 
competitiveness in a transitional economy. In the second scenario (between migrants and urbanites), the 
goals of the state and the market become congruent, leading to a continual interplay between these two 
forces and therefore enduring inequality based on hukou status. 
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This research also adds to the theoretical perspectives on migrants’ economic incorporation, which have 
mostly been formulated based on the reality of immigrants in industrialized societies. We demonstrate the 
importance of institutional arrangements in conditioning migrants’ integration in the context of internal 
migration, and the similarities and differences between Chinese internal migration and international 
migration in other societies. In both cases, migration streams are largely driven by economic motives as 
well as a growing need for cheap labor (Bonacich, 1972; Portes and DeWind, 2004). Migrants often exist 
as undocumented persons and suffer from social and economic discrimination, whether blatant or subtle. 
Nevertheless, the Chinese case is distinct in that the state has instituted a system designating citizens in its 
own country different rights and privileges. Moreover, in other societies, there has been a constant tension 
between the need of a competitive market economy and that of the state in regulating immigrant flows 
(Castles, 2004; Hollifield, 2004). However, upon arrival, whereas immigrant-native inequality still exists, 
discrimination against immigrants has gradually abated and some countries have even moved toward 
establishing regulatory regimes to extend certain rights to immigrants (Freeman, 2004; Waters and 
Eschbach, 1995; Rivera-Batiz, 1999). In China, however, the two structural forces have shown 
increasingly intertwined goals and have played complementary roles in maintaining inequality against 
migrants. The Chinese state, while distinguishing itself from other states in that it retains considerable 
control of the market economy, has similarly failed to legislate effectively against discriminatory 
practices against migrants. Therefore, despite unprecedented market reforms and tides of migration in 
China in the past three decades, Chinese migrants have continued to confront stiff, if not impermeable, 
boundaries with deep institutional roots. Importantly, such institutionalized discrimination likely leads to 
other (social) forms of discrimination, which make migrants more susceptible to unequal treatment, 
thereby further perpetuating the migrant-urbanite inequality. This inequality created under socialism has 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 The 1995 Shanghai Floating Population and Resident Survey was conducted in 1995 by the 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, with funding from the Ford Foundation. The survey 
yielded a stratified, multi-stage cluster sample. Six out of the 12 city districts in Shanghai were 
first selected to represent different areas of the Shanghai city. Out of the six selected districts, one 
was from the urban center, three from the central ring (zhonghuan), and two from city-suburb 
junction areas. Within each chosen district, two street districts (jiedao) were selected. Within 
each chosen street district, two neighborhood resident committees (juweihui) were selected. 
These selection procedures resulted in 24 neighborhood resident committees across Shanghai. 
At the last stage of sampling, for each selected neighborhood, every migrant in that area was 
interviewed. The resident survey was also a multi-stage probability sample survey. It surveyed 
Shanghai residents from 60 neighborhood committees in 11 street districts. Both surveys had a 
success rate of over 92%. 
2  The survey was again carried out by the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, with funding 
from Hong Kong Research Grants Council. It similarly followed a stratified, multi-stage cluster 
sampling design. Seven out of the 18 city districts were selected to represent the inner city (city 
center), outer city (new districts and suburbs), and districts in between (central ring). Out of the 
seven districts included in this survey, four were the same as those chosen for the 1995 study. 
Using the probability of eight per ten thousand and following the procedure of probability 
proportional to size (PPS), 36 neighborhood committees (juweihui) were chosen. Within each 
selected neighborhood committee, around 50 households were randomly selected, resulting in 
a targeted sample of 2012 local residents. Within each selected household, the Kish table was 
used to select the respondent to be interviewed. The response rate was 91.2% (1835 completed 
interviews). The sampling of the migrant population followed a similar PPS procedure within the 
selected neighborhood. Based on a 2003 survey of the migrant population conducted by the 
Shanghai city government and the targeted migrant sample size of 2800, we used a probability 
of 5.2%. In 29 out of the 36 neighborhood committees selected, both local residents and 
migrants were interviewed. In addition, local residents and migrants were separately interviewed 
in seven different neighborhoods. Out of the 2974 migrant interviews attempted, 2816, or 94.7%, 
were successful. 
3  One caveat is that this income measure did not include non-cash income and fringe benefits 
(e.g., employer contributions to various insurance schemes), which many urban residents, 
especially those in the state sector, received. As discussed later, this is not likely to change the 
story substantially because it may suggest that the income gap between migrants and urbanites 
was larger than had been observed. To offer a more complete picture, we further examined 
social benefits separately from income using information on whether the respondent had formal 
labor contract and whether the person received medical insurance or pension. 
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4 To evaluate these possibilities, we included measures of start-up financial capital, whether the 
respondent had received support from the local government, and local social capital (whether 
respondents had connections with urbanites). These factors turned out to account for a large 
fraction of the remaining inequality between self-employed migrants and urbanites (results 
available upon request). Therefore, although self-employed migrants fared better than other 
migrants, they failed to compete with urban residents on equal terms and endured many harsh 
realities of doing business in urban China (limited institutional support, financial capital, and 
social capital). 
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Table 1. Characteristics of urban residents and rural migrants in 1995 and 2005 
 1995  2005 
  Residents Rural migrants   Residents 
Rural 
migrants 
Age 40.0 27.2*  39.9 30.9* 
Male 53.9 64.2*  58.0 45.9* 
Currently married 96.4 55.4*  82.1 76.2* 
Education      
  < Middle school 8.9 30.2*,b  5.7 27.1*,b 
  Middle school completed 48.8 61.6  35.3 60.9 
  Some or completed high school 28.6 8.0  35.9 11.2 
  Dazhuan or college 13.7 0.2  23.1 0.9 
Tenure at current job (years) 15.4 1.7*  11.1 3.6* 
Occupation      
  Professional/clerical 33.5 3.2*,b  39.0 3.6*,b 
  Commerce 15.9 15.8  8.0 32.6 
  Service worker 11.5 15.5  19.4 25.2 
  Manual labor 39.0 65.5  33.6 38.6 
Industry      
  Manufacturing and production 53.6 60.2*,b  42.6 40.0*,b 
  Service 17.4 21.3  7.7 32.0 
  Finance, communication, and real estate 6.7 4.7  8.0 1.8 
  Social services 4.3 12.1  21.8 22.1 
  Science, health, education, and entertainment 11.7 1.6  12.8 3.9 
  Government 6.3 0.1  7.1 0.3 
Sector      
  State-sector a   42.9 7.0*,b 
  Non-state-sector employee    53.1 63.3 
  Self-employed    4.0 29.7 
Monthly income (yuan) 805.8 576.9*  1782.9 1510.0* 
Hourly wage (yuan) 4.7 2.6*  10.1 5.9* 
Weekly working hours 42.6 54.4*  44.4 61.3* 
N  2212 3533   1192 1867 
a. No corresponding data in 1995 because migrants and residents were almost exclusively segregated in non-state and state sector, respectively. 
b. For categorical variables, the asterisks indicate statistical joint significance of all categories 
* Difference by migrant status is significant at the 0.001 level. 
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Table 2. Basic statistics of monthly income (yuan) in 1995 and 2005 
 1995 2005 
 Residents Rural migrants Overall Residents Rural 
migrants 
Overall 
Occupation       
  Professional/clerical 940 898 904 2325 1478 2223 
  Commerce 717 626 662 2488 2284 2460 
  Service worker 679 528 576 1414 1008 1142 
  Manual labor 800 559 624 1247 1015 1099 
Sector       
  State-sector a   1829 1140 1691  
  Non-state-sector    1624 1024 1235 
  Self-employment    3390 2633 2693 
Gini coefficient 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.35 0.39 0.38 















Table 3. Survey regressions of monthly income and hourly wage by migration status and other controls in 1995 and 2005 (standard errors in 
parentheses) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Model 1 + 
occupational status 
Model 3 
Model 2 + 
ownership sector 
 1995 2005 1995 2005 2005 
Migration status      
  rural migrants (ref. urban residents) -0.10* 0.04 -0.12** -0.02 -0.09** 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) 
Age  0.05*** 0.03** 0.05*** 0.02* 0.02+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male (ref. female) 0.32*** 0.23*** 0.30*** 0.24*** 0.22*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Married (ref. not married) 0.06 0.16*** 0.06 0.10** 0.09* 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 
Education (ref. < middle school)      
  Middle school completed 0.17*** 0.09+ 0.15*** 0.09+ 0.10* 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
  Some or completed high school 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.19*** 0.24*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
  Dazhuan or college 0.45*** 0.77*** 0.41*** 0.51*** 0.54*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Tenure at current job 0.003 0.01*** 0.002 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.002) (0.00) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Occupation (ref. professional/clerical)      
  Commerce   -0.11* 0.29*** -0.22*** 
   (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) 
  Service worker   -0.15*** -0.22*** -0.20*** 
   (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
  Manual labor   -0.09* -0.40*** -0.37*** 
   (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Industry  
(ref.  manufacturing and production)      
























*** p value < 0.001; ** p value < 0.01; * p value < 0.05; + p value < 0.1. 
Note: For models of hourly wage, other covariates are omitted, which are the same as those adjusted for in the monthly income models. 
   (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
  Finance, communication, and real estate   0.05 -0.02 0.01 
   (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
  Social services   0.05 -0.17*** -0.16*** 
   (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
  Science, health, education, and entertainment   -0.13* -0.01 -0.02 
   (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
  Government   -0.10+ 0.13 0.15+ 
   (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) 
Ownership type (ref. state employee)      
  Non-state sector employee     0.04 
     (0.03) 
  Self-employed     0.76*** 
     (0.09) 
Constant 5.25*** 6.19*** 5.45*** 6.74*** 6.85*** 
 (0.17) (0.20) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19) 
R-square 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.36 0.40 
      
Hourly wage      
  Rural migrants (ref. urban residents) -0.22*** -0.22*** -0.26*** -0.20*** -0.24*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
R-square 0.25 0.32 0.27 0.37 0.41 
N 5745 3046 5745 3046 3046 
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Table 4. Survey multinomial regressions of occupational and sectoral segregation in 1995 and 2005 (standard errors in parentheses) 
 Occupation (base=professional) Ownership (base=state sector) 
 Commerce Service Manual Non-state Self-employed 
1995 (N=6441)      
  Rural migrants  
  (ref. urban residents) 0.60+ 0.14 1.41*** -- a -- 
 (0.33) (0.32) (0.25)   
      
2005 (N=3491)      
  Rural migrants  
 (ref. urban residents) 2.76*** 1.48*** 1.29*** 0.89** 3.03 *** 
 (0.29) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.32) 
*** p value < 0.001; ** p value < 0.01; * p value < 0.05; + p value < 0.1. 
Note: Other covariates are omitted, which include age, gender, marital status, education, and training status.  














Table 5. Survey regressions of monthly income and hourly wage by ownership sectors in 2005 (standard errors in parentheses) 
 State employee Non-state 
employee 
Self-employed 
Monthly Income    
  Migration status    
     Rural migrants  
     (ref. urban residents) -0.04 -0.07* -0.22+ 
 (0.08) (0.03) (0.12) 
R-square 0.39 0.43 0.26 
    
Hourly Wage    
  Migration status    
     Rural migrants  
     (ref. urban residents) -0.19+ -0.22*** -0.35** 
 (0.10) (0.05) (0.13) 
R-square 0.35 0.46 0.29 
N 639 1805 602 
*** p value < 0.001; ** p value < 0.01; * p value < 0.05; + p value < 0.1. 
Note: Other covariates are omitted, which are the same as in Table 3. 
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